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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive neuroscience holds the   promise 
of explaining operations of the mind in 
terms of the physical operations of the 
brain. It is claimed that brain imaging tech-
niques now allow the discovery of neuro-
physiologic markers for almost any kind of 
behavioural phenotype, normal or patho-
logical, both at explanatory and predictive 
level. Since early 2000, law has taken part in 
this debate within the parameters of neu-
roethics, a new interdisciplinary ﬁ  eld “at the 
intersection of the empirical brain sciences, 
normative ethics, the philosophy of mind, 
law and the social sciences of anthropol-
ogy, economics, psychology and sociology” 
(Glannon, 2007).
When issues like these are discussed in 
legal contexts a normal ﬁ  rst reaction is to 
wonder whether a more complete under-
standing of the neural mechanism for vol-
untary decision-making might undermine 
the legal notion of accountability. Would 
brain scans that reveal a brain feature cor-
related, even weakly, with a propensity 
for violence, inﬂ  uence a court’s sentence? 
Will brain imaging subvert the current 
nosography of mental diseases? Is free will 
still alive?
In this paper, after a short presentation 
of these issues, we maintain that it is nei-
ther exhaustive, in theoretical terms, nor 
productive to face the new reality in this 
way. The issue is factually and conceptu-
ally wider than that. In some respects this 
approach might seem to be less noble 
(almost everything is banal if compared 
with free will) but, in the end, the questions 
that arise might be even more challenging; 
e.g. the social/mental/technical/biological 
boundaries of any individual who might 
be under discussion.
NEUROSCIENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES
There are various approaches to the impact 
of neuroscience on the law. One believes 
that neuroscience could in time overcome 
ancient illusions (e.g. free will). This posi-
tion is clearly and cogently expressed thus 
by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen: “… 
for the law, neuroscience changes nothing 
and everything. Free will as we ordinarily 
understand it is an illusion generated by our 
cognitive architecture. Retributivist notions 
of criminal responsibility ultimately depend 
on this illusion and, if we are lucky, they will 
give way to consequentialist ones, thus radi-
cally transforming our approach to criminal 
justice” (Greene and Cohen, 2004). Greene 
and Cohen thus openly declare their accept-
ance of the theory that neuroscientiﬁ  c ﬁ  nd-
ings will have a transformative effect on 
people’s moral perception about free will 
and responsibility. Other scholars are even 
more positive. Abigail Baird and Jonathan 
Fugelsang, for example, point to brain 
imaging technology as an important oppor-
tunity to demonstrate once and for all the 
cerebral development of adolescents, with 
the consequent impossibility of considering 
a teenager as being fully criminally respon-
sible (Baird and Fugelsang, 2004). This is 
particularly important in the USA context, 
where only recently the Federal Supreme 
Court excluded the possibility of a death 
sentence with reference to an adolescent on 
trial. Support comes also from Erin O’Hara, 
who states she is one of a group of scholars 
who consider that a better knowledge of the 
brain could help to understand the validity 
of human behavior theories, thus pragmati-
cally advancing the law (O’Hara, 2004).
The second approach, conversely, incor-
porates neuroscientiﬁ  c discoveries within 
pre-existing legal categories. Stephen Morse, 
the main proponent of this position, explic-
itly argues that legal and scientiﬁ  c categories 
will remain separate, even after these new 
developments in neuroscience. In other 
words, neuroscience will never be able to 
tell law who is or is not to be considered 
criminally responsible: law and science can-
not answer each other’s questions. Morse 
coins a term to describe the  overestimation 
of the role of the brain in the commission 
of a crime: Brain Overclaim Syndrome 
(Morse, 2004). Similarly, Alan Felthous and 
Henning Sab hold that brain imaging for 
assessment of criminal responsibility would 
not be appropriate, because American 
jurisprudence does not rest on a premise 
of free will. Rather, the law sets standards 
for criminal responsibility and various deci-
sional capacities that relate to psychologi-
cal functions. Whether brain imaging and 
other neurosciences can one day provide 
complete alternative explanations of func-
tions of the will based on natural causation 
is therefore irrelevant (Felthous and Sab, 
2008). Tancredi and Brodie come to similar 
conclusions, afﬁ  rming the impossibility of 
explaining criminal behavior on the basis of 
a single neuroscientiﬁ  c test (Tancredi and 
Brodie, 2007).
A third point of view is that put by 
the neuroscientist David M. Eagleman, 
who maintains that people are generally 
not aware of all the factors driving their 
behavior even if the legal system rests on 
the assumption that we are practical “rea-
soners”, free to choose how we act. Rather, 
neural understanding of behaviors will 
lead to “better prediction of recidivism, a 
rational basis of sentencing and custom-
ized rehabilitation” (Eagleman, 2008). 
A  change in the way of sentencing and 
practical reasoning may lead to more for-
ward-thinking legislation, in which prison 
terms are predicated on the perceived risk 
of recidivism, structuring positive and 
negative incentives to take better advantage 
of people’s neural mechanism.
BRAIN AND BIOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES
Although the importance of this debate 
should not be overlooked, we think that 
a survey of the technological applications 
of neuroscience on the human body, and 
their related impact on the law – even 
beyond the ﬁ  eld of criminal law – would Santosuosso and Bottalico  Neuroscience and individual boundaries
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be extremely helpful in order to properly 
focus the issue. A provisional list of appli-
cations is the following:
•  Brain-machine-web connections and 
the creation of cyborgs are now less of 
a futuristic issue given that new orga-
nic/synthetic interfaces allow compu-
ters to read, interpret and interact with 
human nerve ﬁ   bers. This represents 
new opportunities for people affected 
by diseases such as muscular dystrophy. 
Moreover, a few years ago, unforeseen 
chances opened up for healthy people 
wanting to improve their level of com-
munication and mental performance.
• Scientiﬁ  c methods of selection could be 
used by schools or by ﬁ  rms on the basis 
of speciﬁ  c attitudes revealed by brain 
scanning tests.
•  In recent years it has become possible 
to ameliorate the mental condition 
of brain-stressed people: drugs such 
as Provigil and Ritalin, which make it 
possible to not perceive fatigue for an 
extended time, are used by students to 
improve their scholastic performances.
•  The current deﬁ  nition of brain death 
has moved on from that formulated 
by the Ad Hoc Committee to examine 
the deﬁ  nition of Brain Death of Harvard 
Medical School (1968) and its following 
revisions. The new neuroscientiﬁ  c tech-
nologies may now enable us to reﬁ  ne 
our comprehension of the residual acti-
vity found in a person’s brain when no 
organized neural activity seems to be 
present. They would be important also 
in relation to surgical intervention on 
the human brain.
Overall, this short survey seems to con-
ﬁ  rm that the impact of neuroscience on 
responsibility and criminal law is factually 
and conceptually wider than usually consid-
ered. One conclusion is immediately appar-
ent. The impact of neuroscience is plural 
and fragmented in its various effects, which 
differ in kind and importance. In some cases 
neuroscience leads to a reduced detention 
period (as in the case of juvenile capital 
punishment in USA cited above) or even 
to acquittal; in others it might increase the 
level of legal restrictions on individuals 
(e.g. in the case of people whose   freedom 
is   limited because of their potentially 
 aggressive  mental condition). In other cases, 
however, a deeper knowledge of the mental 
condition of patients might bring doctors 
to consider a higher number of patients as 
eligible for a guardianship decision.
However, considering these areas of the 
impact of neuroscience on law, it seems to 
us that the neuro-induced redeﬁ  nition of 
the biological and mental boundaries of 
any individual is the most critical point. 
Of course this is not new and neuroscience 
is only the latest reason for reopening the 
issue. In recent decades, human biologi-
cal limits look like a ﬁ  eld where battles are 
fought, peace treaties signed and boundary 
lines drawn. All this, of course, depends on 
the extensive application of human genet-
ics, new biotechnologies and medical tech-
niques in health services, biological research 
and society. All human individuals, as bio-
logical entities, are deeply affected by these 
developments.. Advances such as artiﬁ  cial 
ventilation, new resuscitation techniques, 
artiﬁ   cial nutrition and hydration have 
prolonged people’s lives. Assisted reproduc-
tion techniques have widened the oppor-
tunities of bearing children. Furthermore, 
individuals are given the possibility to radi-
cally change their physical state even when 
there is no disease (at least in traditional 
terms), such as in the case of transsexuals. 
The list of biotechnological opportunities 
grows longer every day with the addition 
of new items such as genetic manipulation. 
As a result, the possibility of re-determin-
ing human biological limits, and selecting 
options, is further increased (Santosuosso 
et al., 2007).
CONCLUSION
The contribution of neuroscience to the 
battleﬁ  eld might be summarized in the fol-
lowing terms. If the question of individual 
boundaries is given priority, the age-old 
question of free will may no longer be at 
the forefront. Furthermore, we may discover 
that an individual’s will is intertwined with 
those of other people. If so, should we move 
from the concept of an individual (free) will 
towards a social group’s will? Are associations 
like this merely temporary? Is immediate 
opting-out guaranteed? Who is the indi-
vidual that will opt out? Will it be the “who” 
that freely decided to join the association? 
Or will it be the “new who” that is the result 
of the experience of association? Are they 
the same person? In other words, does the 
individual identity survive the association? 
Is the free, informed decision to associate a 
sufﬁ  cient guarantee? Or should a guardian 
be appointed in order to assure the freedom 
of decision (whose?) and respect for the con-
ditions necessary for opting out?
Questions like these, even though not 
new in philosophical debate (Parﬁ  t, 1984), 
are now on the legal agenda and require a 
social response. From a legal viewpoint the 
question might be conceptualized as a matter 
of sovereignty. In other words, once nature 
is out of play and is no longer able to tell us 
what to do or not to do, the question Who has 
the power and is entitled to draw the boundary 
line for each individual? becomes crucial. At 
the moment we do not have a better idea than 
to entitle and empower each individual.
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